{
  "schema": "varexis-public-evidence-record/0.3",
  "generated_at_utc": "2026-10-25T20:55:19.974986+00:00",
  "record_id": "VXI-EXT-PROCUREMENT-RAR-FRONT-CHANNEL-INTEGRITY-01-v1",
  "record_kind": "external_reference",
  "title": "OAuth RAR front-channel integrity",
  "system": "IETF RFC 9396",
  "evidence_family": "vendor_evidence_review",
  "index_status": "PUBLIC_SAFE_SOURCE_REVIEW",
  "evidence_state": "PRIMARY_DOCUMENTATION_REVIEW_ONLY",
  "canonical_question": "Does sending payment authorization_details through a browser protect them from replacement?",
  "near_questions": [
    "Can browser-carried RAR payment terms be altered?",
    "What protects authorization_details on the front channel?",
    "Does a pushed authorization request prove payment settlement?",
    "Should signed RAR request terms still be checked against the grant?"
  ],
  "supported_claims": [
    {
      "claim": "RFC 9396 warns that authorization details sent through the front channel can be tampered with or swapped. It recommends integrity protection such as signed request objects or pushed authorization requests. Protecting those request terms does not establish that the server granted them, that the client may execute them, or that a payment settled.",
      "reliance": "DOCUMENTED_CAPABILITY_ONLY"
    }
  ],
  "not_demonstrated_claims": [
    "Preserve the source conditional: when parameter integrity is a concern it MUST be protected. Signing or pushing the request does not prove user approval, transaction execution, payment settlement, or a secure deployment.",
    "Buyer implementation, live runtime enforcement, settled payment, physical outcome, certification or permission to act are not established.",
    "No expanded capabilities or licences for existing INDEX executables."
  ],
  "public_summary": "RFC 9396 warns that authorization details sent through the front channel can be tampered with or swapped. It recommends integrity protection such as signed request objects or pushed authorization requests. Protecting those request terms does not establish that the server granted them, that the client may execute them, or that a payment settled.",
  "related_record_ids": [],
  "source_review": {
    "source_type": "official_external_documentation",
    "source_title": "IETF RFC 9396",
    "source_url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9396.txt",
    "checked_on": "2026-10-25",
    "candidate_record_id": "VXI-EXT-PROCUREMENT-RAR-FRONT-CHANNEL-INTEGRITY-01-v1",
    "candidate_record_sha256": "8e3deaa8af87fdd54f731c7649b2355643c8a3425930562d8c0cd37cbbf8853e",
    "method": "Primary documentation reviewed for the published bounded statement.",
    "deployment_tested_by_varexis": false,
    "revalidation": "The delivered snapshot preserves the review date shown. Recheck current primary documentation and deployment context before relying on present applicability; payment does not trigger fresh research."
  },
  "answer_policy": {
    "classification": "DOCUMENTED_WITH_DEPLOYMENT_BOUNDARY",
    "bounded_answer": "RFC 9396 warns that authorization details sent through the front channel can be tampered with or swapped. It recommends integrity protection such as signed request objects or pushed authorization requests. Protecting those request terms does not establish that the server granted them, that the client may execute them, or that a payment settled.",
    "required_buyer_context": "Request transport and integrity mechanism; Original and received authorization details; Returned grant and later outcome. Buyer deployment not inspected.",
    "missing_evidence": "A broader claim needs evidence matching the intended use. Payment does not upgrade the evidence state."
  },
  "private_boundary": "Raw logs, thresholds, private paths, source code, protected mechanisms and reconstruction-level details are excluded from public and paid delivery.",
  "decision_profile": {
    "schema": "varexis-vendor-evidence-review/1",
    "review_status": "documentation_review_only",
    "checked_on": "2026-10-25",
    "claim_to_check": "Does sending payment authorization_details through a browser protect them from replacement?",
    "documented_statement": {
      "status": "documented",
      "statement": "RFC 9396 warns that authorization details sent through the front channel can be tampered with or swapped. It recommends integrity protection such as signed request objects or pushed authorization requests. Protecting those request terms does not establish that the server granted them, that the client may execute them, or that a payment settled.",
      "source_ids": [
        "rfc9396"
      ]
    },
    "review_inference": {
      "status": "review_inference",
      "statement": "Bind the approved payment terms to an integrity-protected authorization request. This is a documentation-review judgment, not an observed deployment outcome.",
      "source_ids": [
        "rfc9396"
      ]
    },
    "buyer_evidence_required": [
      "Request transport and integrity mechanism",
      "Original and received authorization details",
      "Returned grant and later outcome"
    ],
    "review_condition": {
      "status": "varexis_review_policy",
      "statement": "Refuse buyer-specific assurance from documentation alone. Preserve the source conditional: when parameter integrity is a concern it MUST be protected. Signing or pushing the request does not prove user approval, transaction execution, payment settlement, or a secure deployment."
    },
    "unknowns": "The buyer implementation, effective configuration, complete evidence inventory and actual business outcome were not inspected.",
    "unknown_finding": {
      "status": "unknown",
      "statement": "The buyer implementation, effective configuration, complete evidence inventory and actual business outcome were not inspected."
    },
    "evidence_sources": [
      {
        "source_id": "rfc9396",
        "url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9396.txt",
        "final_url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9396.txt",
        "status": 200,
        "captured_at_utc": "2026-10-25T20:04:28.371Z",
        "sha256": "d6a8f032d8a585daae1c33a8c7b6e539d199f886ec8cc1c7898436f7f2eed29c",
        "bytes": 65926,
        "title": "IETF RFC 9396",
        "hash_basis": "SHA-256 of unmodified HTTP response body bytes",
        "rights_review": "Original factual paraphrase of the cited IETF RFC; IETF Trust and contributor rights remain applicable. No RFC text, code component or modified standard is redistributed.",
        "checked_on": "2026-10-25",
        "capture_status": 200,
        "claim_review_completed": true,
        "reviewed_sections": [
          "Sections 3, 7 and 7.1",
          "Section 2.2",
          "Section 6.1",
          "Section 3.1",
          "Section 3.2",
          "Section 5",
          "Section 12"
        ],
        "version_context": "Fixed IETF RFC 9396 publication; later applicable updates and actual implementation conformance require separate review."
      }
    ],
    "observed_deployment": false,
    "commercial_reliance_boundary": "Documentation review only; the buyer must establish applicability and actual outcomes. INDEX does not inspect or control the deployment.",
    "paid_value": {
      "decision_context": "Bind the approved payment terms to an integrity-protected authorization request.",
      "free": "Complete review, practical questions, sources and limitations; may be saved locally.",
      "single_request": "Existing server-saved version-bound route snapshot for later authenticated retrieval.",
      "evidence_receipt": "The same snapshot plus the existing unsigned delivery receipt.",
      "excluded": [
        "Fresh vendor research",
        "Continuous monitoring or change alerts",
        "Testing the buyer configuration",
        "Private evidence or vendor certification"
      ],
      "integrity": "Hashes identify content versions; they do not prove truth or provide a signature."
    },
    "revalidation": {
      "trigger": "A saved purchase does not recheck the source or buyer configuration.",
      "specific_watch": "Recheck Section 12 in IETF RFC 9396 when the source, applicable version, configuration or intended reliance changes. A detected change creates a review candidate, not automatic approval."
    },
    "buyer_relevance": "Bind the approved payment terms to an integrity-protected authorization request.",
    "refusal_conditions": [
      "Refuse buyer-specific assurance from documentation alone. Preserve the source conditional: when parameter integrity is a concern it MUST be protected. Signing or pushing the request does not prove user approval, transaction execution, payment settlement, or a secure deployment."
    ]
  },
  "niche": {
    "niche_id": "agent-authority-action-evidence",
    "label": "Agent Authority & Action Evidence",
    "classification_id": "governance",
    "classification_label": "Agent Governance & Policy Boundaries",
    "topic_id": "governance",
    "buyer_intent": "Bind the approved payment terms to an integrity-protected authorization request.",
    "comparison_role": "supplementary_discovery"
  },
  "paid_access_note": "The full published answer and boundaries are free. Paid access saves the selected route and source versions, with an unsigned receipt when purchased. Preview coverage before paying. Fresh research, bespoke assessment and protected evidence are excluded.",
  "service_route": {
    "request_guide": "/varexis-index/request.html",
    "request_workflow": "/varexis-index/request-workflow.json",
    "service_id": "single_request",
    "service_routes_url": "/varexis-index/service-routes.json",
    "payment_required": true,
    "availability_endpoint": "/api/index/capabilities",
    "operational_status": "AUTOMATIC_SERVICE_CAPABILITIES_GATED",
    "checkout_url": "/index-access"
  },
  "authority_boundary": "VAREXIS-INDEX informs evidence reliance. It does not provide advice, certification, deployment authority, security assurance, production approval, or guarantee.",
  "human_page": "/varexis-index/catalog.html#rar-front-channel-integrity",
  "machine_readable_record": "/varexis-index/records/rar-front-channel-integrity.json"
}