{
  "schema": "varexis-public-evidence-record/0.3",
  "generated_at_utc": "2026-10-14T01:25:58.088Z",
  "record_id": "VXI-EXT-PROCUREMENT-POSTGRES-RLS-PRIVILEGES-01-v1",
  "record_kind": "external_reference",
  "title": "PostgreSQL RLS: Effective roles and policy exceptions",
  "system": "PostgreSQL row-level security",
  "evidence_family": "vendor_evidence_review",
  "index_status": "PUBLIC_SAFE_SOURCE_REVIEW",
  "evidence_state": "PRIMARY_DOCUMENTATION_REVIEW_ONLY",
  "canonical_question": "Does enabling row-level security constrain every database identity?",
  "near_questions": [
    "Does row-level security restrict a database superuser?",
    "Can a table owner bypass row policies?",
    "Which effective role does the application use?",
    "What does forcing row security change for an owner?",
    "Does enabling RLS without a policy allow normal row access?",
    "Are whole-table operations covered like row reads?",
    "What evidence supports an RLS tenant-isolation claim?",
    "Can an administrative test represent the application role?",
    "Which role attributes should procurement ask to inspect?",
    "Does an RLS setting prove every operation is filtered?",
    "Can I save the reviewed row-security exceptions?",
    "When should role changes trigger another isolation review?"
  ],
  "supported_claims": [
    {
      "claim": "No. PostgreSQL documents exceptions for superusers, BYPASSRLS roles and normally table owners; owners can opt into forced row security. Whole-table operations also have distinct treatment. Review the actual role and operation before using RLS enablement as evidence of tenant isolation.",
      "reliance": "DOCUMENTED_CAPABILITY_ONLY"
    }
  ],
  "not_demonstrated_claims": [
    "Verified buyer configuration or effective access rights",
    "Independent execution, completeness or security testing",
    "Vendor certification, legal compliance or guaranteed suitability"
  ],
  "public_summary": "No. PostgreSQL documents exceptions for superusers, BYPASSRLS roles and normally table owners; owners can opt into forced row security. Whole-table operations also have distinct treatment. Review the actual role and operation before using RLS enablement as evidence of tenant isolation.",
  "related_record_ids": [
    "VXI-EXT-PROCUREMENT-PINECONE-TENANT-ROUTING-01-v1",
    "VXI-EXT-PROCUREMENT-SNOWFLAKE-QUERY-HISTORY-01-v1",
    "VXI-EXT-PROCUREMENT-MONGODB-RESUME-01-v1",
    "VXI-EXT-PROCUREMENT-DATABRICKS-CONNECTION-GRANTS-01-v1"
  ],
  "source_review": {
    "source_type": "official_external_documentation",
    "source_title": "PostgreSQL row security and privileged role exceptions",
    "source_url": "https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/ddl-rowsecurity.html",
    "checked_on": "2026-10-14",
    "candidate_record_id": "VXI-EXT-PROCUREMENT-POSTGRES-RLS-PRIVILEGES-01-v1",
    "candidate_record_sha256": "1fe01aa17f8a0ca94b839aae86c9204916f79d9aad8adf7712a412d3c615979d",
    "method": "Primary documentation reviewed for the published bounded statement.",
    "deployment_tested_by_varexis": false,
    "revalidation": "The delivered snapshot preserves the review date shown. Recheck current primary documentation and deployment context before relying on present applicability; payment does not trigger fresh research."
  },
  "answer_policy": {
    "classification": "DOCUMENTED_WITH_DEPLOYMENT_BOUNDARY",
    "bounded_answer": "No. PostgreSQL documents exceptions for superusers, BYPASSRLS roles and normally table owners; owners can opt into forced row security. Whole-table operations also have distinct treatment. Review the actual role and operation before using RLS enablement as evidence of tenant isolation.",
    "required_buyer_context": "Database version, table owner, effective role attributes, policy and operation type.",
    "missing_evidence": "A broader claim needs evidence matching the intended use. Payment does not upgrade the evidence state."
  },
  "private_boundary": "Raw logs, thresholds, private paths, source code, protected mechanisms and reconstruction-level details are excluded from public and paid delivery.",
  "decision_profile": {
    "schema": "varexis-vendor-evidence-review/1",
    "review_status": "documentation_review_only",
    "checked_on": "2026-10-14",
    "claim_to_check": "An RLS-enabled table restricts every caller to tenant rows.",
    "documented_statement": {
      "status": "documented",
      "statement": "No. PostgreSQL documents exceptions for superusers, BYPASSRLS roles and normally table owners; owners can opt into forced row security. Whole-table operations also have distinct treatment. Review the actual role and operation before using RLS enablement as evidence of tenant isolation.",
      "source_ids": [
        "postgres-rls"
      ]
    },
    "buyer_evidence_required": [
      "Effective connecting role and relevant role attributes",
      "Table ownership, force setting and policy definitions",
      "Authorised tests using the application identity and operation type"
    ],
    "review_condition": {
      "status": "varexis_review_policy",
      "statement": "Do not accept universal isolation from RLS enablement alone."
    },
    "unknowns": "The buyer configuration, contract, effective entitlement and operational evidence have not been inspected. Missing evidence does not establish absence or failure of the feature.",
    "evidence_sources": [
      {
        "source_id": "postgres-rls",
        "url": "https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/ddl-rowsecurity.html",
        "final_url": "https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/ddl-rowsecurity.html",
        "title": "PostgreSQL row security and privileged role exceptions",
        "checked_on": "2026-10-14",
        "sha256": "b789a48ba224bf61d2ea8b7593f1656a78aeaab4cceda5a9cb50245cb9fc4830",
        "bytes": 31254
      }
    ],
    "observed_deployment": false,
    "commercial_reliance_boundary": "Procurement evidence support only; no supplier clearance, legal conclusion, configuration audit or verification of the buyer's claim is supplied.",
    "paid_value": {
      "decision_context": "Preserve the role and policy distinctions for a database-access review.",
      "free": "Complete review, practical questions, sources and limitations; may be saved locally.",
      "single_request": "Existing server-saved version-bound route snapshot for later authenticated retrieval.",
      "evidence_receipt": "The same snapshot plus the existing unsigned delivery receipt.",
      "excluded": [
        "Fresh vendor research",
        "Continuous monitoring or change alerts",
        "Testing the buyer configuration",
        "Private evidence or vendor certification"
      ],
      "integrity": "Hashes identify content versions; they do not prove truth or provide a signature."
    },
    "revalidation": {
      "trigger": "A saved purchase does not recheck the source or buyer configuration.",
      "specific_watch": "Recheck role grants, ownership, policies and database upgrades."
    }
  },
  "paid_access_note": "The full published answer and boundaries are free. Paid access saves the selected route and source versions, with an unsigned receipt when purchased. Preview coverage before paying. Fresh research, bespoke assessment and protected evidence are excluded.",
  "service_route": {
    "request_guide": "/varexis-index/request.html",
    "request_workflow": "/varexis-index/request-workflow.json",
    "service_id": "single_request",
    "service_routes_url": "/varexis-index/service-routes.json",
    "payment_required": true,
    "availability_endpoint": "/api/index/capabilities",
    "operational_status": "AUTOMATIC_SERVICE_CAPABILITIES_GATED",
    "checkout_url": "/index-access"
  },
  "authority_boundary": "VAREXIS-INDEX informs evidence reliance. It does not provide advice, certification, deployment authority, security assurance, production approval, or guarantee.",
  "human_page": "/varexis-index/catalog.html#postgres-rls-role-exception-evidence",
  "machine_readable_record": "/varexis-index/records/postgres-rls-role-exception-evidence.json"
}