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  "title": "MCP authorization URL handling",
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    "When does MCP permit HTTP authorization URLs?",
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      "status": "review_inference",
      "statement": "Validate the actual URL before opening it and preserve the authorization-server binding across the flow.",
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        "checked_on": "2026-10-24",
        "capture_status": 200,
        "claim_review_completed": true,
        "reviewed_sections": [
          "OAuth Authorization URL Validation",
          "URL Scheme Validation",
          "Secure URL Opening"
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        "version_context": "Model Context Protocol specification 2026-07-28, pinned URL."
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    "commercial_reliance_boundary": "Documentation review only; the buyer must establish applicability and actual outcomes. INDEX does not inspect or control the deployment.",
    "paid_value": {
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      "specific_watch": "Recheck the documented behavior, product version and buyer evidence before relying on a current outcome."
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    "buyer_relevance": "Prevent the authorization handoff from becoming an unreviewed client execution path.",
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    "niche_id": "agent-authority-action-evidence",
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    "classification_label": "Agent Governance & Policy Boundaries",
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    "buyer_intent": "Prevent the authorization handoff from becoming an unreviewed client execution path.",
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