{
  "schema": "varexis-public-evidence-record/0.3",
  "generated_at_utc": "2026-10-25T20:55:19.974986+00:00",
  "record_id": "VXI-EXT-PROCUREMENT-HTTP-SIGNATURE-PROXY-COMPONENT-SOURCE-01-v1",
  "record_kind": "external_reference",
  "title": "HTTP signature context behind a proxy",
  "system": "IETF RFC 9421",
  "evidence_family": "vendor_evidence_review",
  "index_status": "PUBLIC_SAFE_SOURCE_REVIEW",
  "evidence_state": "PRIMARY_DOCUMENTATION_REVIEW_ONLY",
  "canonical_question": "Does successful signature verification behind a reverse proxy establish that the request targeted the correct service?",
  "near_questions": [
    "Which authority should a proxied HTTP signature use?",
    "Can untrusted forwarded headers contaminate a signature base?",
    "Does a configured external URI need a recipient mapping?",
    "Could proxy context make a signature valid for the wrong service?"
  ],
  "supported_claims": [
    {
      "claim": "RFC 9421 warns that derived signature components must come from trusted context. A reverse-proxy deployment can use a configured external target URI, but a mistaken mapping may accept a request intended for another component. Signer and verifier must agree on the relevant message and authority; an arbitrary forwarded value is not trustworthy merely because it helps validation pass.",
      "reliance": "DOCUMENTED_CAPABILITY_ONLY"
    }
  ],
  "not_demonstrated_claims": [
    "Configured external context must match the intended recipient; an untrusted forwarded value can contaminate signature-base derivation.",
    "Buyer implementation, live runtime enforcement, settled payment, physical outcome, certification or permission to act are not established.",
    "No expanded capabilities or licences for existing INDEX executables."
  ],
  "public_summary": "RFC 9421 warns that derived signature components must come from trusted context. A reverse-proxy deployment can use a configured external target URI, but a mistaken mapping may accept a request intended for another component. Signer and verifier must agree on the relevant message and authority; an arbitrary forwarded value is not trustworthy merely because it helps validation pass.",
  "related_record_ids": [],
  "source_review": {
    "source_type": "official_external_documentation",
    "source_title": "IETF RFC 9421",
    "source_url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9421.txt",
    "checked_on": "2026-10-25",
    "candidate_record_id": "VXI-EXT-PROCUREMENT-HTTP-SIGNATURE-PROXY-COMPONENT-SOURCE-01-v1",
    "candidate_record_sha256": "d54026949b7bed618867bb575cf60aea5b70d9b4b46c70b16ab8e024b22e44d9",
    "method": "Primary documentation reviewed for the published bounded statement.",
    "deployment_tested_by_varexis": false,
    "revalidation": "The delivered snapshot preserves the review date shown. Recheck current primary documentation and deployment context before relying on present applicability; payment does not trigger fresh research."
  },
  "answer_policy": {
    "classification": "DOCUMENTED_WITH_DEPLOYMENT_BOUNDARY",
    "bounded_answer": "RFC 9421 warns that derived signature components must come from trusted context. A reverse-proxy deployment can use a configured external target URI, but a mistaken mapping may accept a request intended for another component. Signer and verifier must agree on the relevant message and authority; an arbitrary forwarded value is not trustworthy merely because it helps validation pass.",
    "required_buyer_context": "Trusted proxy configuration; External and internal target mapping; Component derivation and intended recipient. Buyer deployment not inspected.",
    "missing_evidence": "A broader claim needs evidence matching the intended use. Payment does not upgrade the evidence state."
  },
  "private_boundary": "Raw logs, thresholds, private paths, source code, protected mechanisms and reconstruction-level details are excluded from public and paid delivery.",
  "decision_profile": {
    "schema": "varexis-vendor-evidence-review/1",
    "review_status": "documentation_review_only",
    "checked_on": "2026-10-25",
    "claim_to_check": "Does successful signature verification behind a reverse proxy establish that the request targeted the correct service?",
    "documented_statement": {
      "status": "documented",
      "statement": "RFC 9421 warns that derived signature components must come from trusted context. A reverse-proxy deployment can use a configured external target URI, but a mistaken mapping may accept a request intended for another component. Signer and verifier must agree on the relevant message and authority; an arbitrary forwarded value is not trustworthy merely because it helps validation pass.",
      "source_ids": [
        "rfc9421"
      ]
    },
    "review_inference": {
      "status": "review_inference",
      "statement": "Establish the trusted source of authority and target URI components across a reverse proxy. This is a documentation-review judgment, not an observed deployment outcome.",
      "source_ids": [
        "rfc9421"
      ]
    },
    "buyer_evidence_required": [
      "Trusted proxy configuration",
      "External and internal target mapping",
      "Component derivation and intended recipient"
    ],
    "review_condition": {
      "status": "varexis_review_policy",
      "statement": "Refuse buyer-specific assurance from documentation alone. Configured external context must match the intended recipient; an untrusted forwarded value can contaminate signature-base derivation."
    },
    "unknowns": "The buyer implementation, effective configuration, complete evidence inventory and actual business outcome were not inspected.",
    "unknown_finding": {
      "status": "unknown",
      "statement": "The buyer implementation, effective configuration, complete evidence inventory and actual business outcome were not inspected."
    },
    "evidence_sources": [
      {
        "source_id": "rfc9421",
        "url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9421.txt",
        "final_url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9421.txt",
        "status": 200,
        "captured_at_utc": "2026-10-25T20:26:12.767Z",
        "sha256": "612655786bf4293bfc486e4177571467fbb3de6e6f0eea90cb74c346a34fdf3c",
        "bytes": 241160,
        "title": "IETF RFC 9421",
        "hash_basis": "SHA-256 of unmodified HTTP response body bytes",
        "rights_review": "Original factual paraphrase of the cited IETF RFC; IETF Trust and contributor rights remain applicable. No RFC text, code component or modified standard is redistributed.",
        "checked_on": "2026-10-25",
        "capture_status": 200,
        "claim_review_completed": true,
        "reviewed_sections": [
          "3.2.1",
          "7.2.1",
          "7.2.2",
          "2.4",
          "7.2.5",
          "7.2.6",
          "7.3.4",
          "7.2.8",
          "7.4.3"
        ],
        "version_context": "Fixed IETF RFC 9421 publication; later applicable updates and actual implementation conformance require separate review."
      }
    ],
    "observed_deployment": false,
    "commercial_reliance_boundary": "Documentation review only; the buyer must establish applicability and actual outcomes. INDEX does not inspect or control the deployment.",
    "paid_value": {
      "decision_context": "Establish the trusted source of authority and target URI components across a reverse proxy.",
      "free": "Complete review, practical questions, sources and limitations; may be saved locally.",
      "single_request": "Existing server-saved version-bound route snapshot for later authenticated retrieval.",
      "evidence_receipt": "The same snapshot plus the existing unsigned delivery receipt.",
      "excluded": [
        "Fresh vendor research",
        "Continuous monitoring or change alerts",
        "Testing the buyer configuration",
        "Private evidence or vendor certification"
      ],
      "integrity": "Hashes identify content versions; they do not prove truth or provide a signature."
    },
    "revalidation": {
      "trigger": "A saved purchase does not recheck the source or buyer configuration.",
      "specific_watch": "Recheck 7.4.3 in IETF RFC 9421 when the source, applicable version, configuration or intended reliance changes. A detected change creates a review candidate, not automatic approval."
    },
    "buyer_relevance": "Establish the trusted source of authority and target URI components across a reverse proxy.",
    "refusal_conditions": [
      "Refuse buyer-specific assurance from documentation alone. Configured external context must match the intended recipient; an untrusted forwarded value can contaminate signature-base derivation."
    ]
  },
  "niche": {
    "niche_id": "agent-authority-action-evidence",
    "label": "Agent Authority & Action Evidence",
    "classification_id": "audit",
    "classification_label": "Audit, Provenance & Evidence Accountability",
    "topic_id": "audit",
    "buyer_intent": "Establish the trusted source of authority and target URI components across a reverse proxy.",
    "comparison_role": "supplementary_discovery"
  },
  "paid_access_note": "The full published answer and boundaries are free. Paid access saves the selected route and source versions, with an unsigned receipt when purchased. Preview coverage before paying. Fresh research, bespoke assessment and protected evidence are excluded.",
  "service_route": {
    "request_guide": "/varexis-index/request.html",
    "request_workflow": "/varexis-index/request-workflow.json",
    "service_id": "single_request",
    "service_routes_url": "/varexis-index/service-routes.json",
    "payment_required": true,
    "availability_endpoint": "/api/index/capabilities",
    "operational_status": "AUTOMATIC_SERVICE_CAPABILITIES_GATED",
    "checkout_url": "/index-access"
  },
  "authority_boundary": "VAREXIS-INDEX informs evidence reliance. It does not provide advice, certification, deployment authority, security assurance, production approval, or guarantee.",
  "human_page": "/varexis-index/catalog.html#http-signature-proxy-component-source",
  "machine_readable_record": "/varexis-index/records/http-signature-proxy-component-source.json"
}