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  "record_id": "VXI-EXT-PROCUREMENT-DPOP-REFRESH-CLIENT-TYPE-KEY-BINDING-01-v1",
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  "title": "DPoP refresh-token binding by client type",
  "system": "IETF RFC 9449",
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  "canonical_question": "Do public and confidential OAuth clients bind refresh tokens to DPoP keys in the same way?",
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    "No expanded capabilities or licences for existing INDEX executables."
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  "public_summary": "RFC 9449 requires a refresh token issued to a public client using DPoP to be bound to that proof key, checked on later refreshes. Confidential-client refresh tokens instead use the existing client binding and authentication requirement. A reviewer must establish the client type and actual binding; the access token's DPoP status alone does not describe every refresh credential.",
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    "unknown_finding": {
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