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  "title": "DPoP proof and client identity binding",
  "system": "IETF RFC 9449",
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  "canonical_question": "Does a valid DPoP proof directly establish the authenticated client's identity?",
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    "Is a proof key automatically the authenticated client identity?",
    "What does sharing one TLS tunnel establish for DPoP?",
    "Does RFC 9449 define every additional client-identity binding?"
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    "No expanded capabilities or licences for existing INDEX executables."
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  "public_summary": "RFC 9449 states that, when used with client authentication, DPoP is coincident with that authentication in the same TLS tunnel rather than directly cryptographically bound to it. The URI can partly limit copying risks, but additional authentication binding is outside this specification. A valid proof of key possession is not by itself a complete authenticated-client identity claim.",
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    "missing_evidence": "A broader claim needs evidence matching the intended use. Payment does not upgrade the evidence state."
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    "unknowns": "The buyer implementation, effective configuration, complete evidence inventory and actual business outcome were not inspected.",
    "unknown_finding": {
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        "rights_review": "Original factual paraphrase of the cited IETF RFC; IETF Trust and contributor rights remain applicable. No RFC text, code component or modified standard is redistributed.",
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        "Testing the buyer configuration",
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  "authority_boundary": "VAREXIS-INDEX informs evidence reliance. It does not provide advice, certification, deployment authority, security assurance, production approval, or guarantee.",
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