OAuth evidence — Cached status and revocation window
Does a cached active introspection result establish that an agent token has not since been revoked?
RFC 7662 permits response caching but warns that it can allow use after revocation until cached state expires. If exp is present, the response must not be cached past it. Cache duration is a resource-specific security and performance choice, not a guarantee of current validity.
Documentation reviewed 2026-11-05. Primary source.
Boundaries
- Do not treat cached active status as current revocation evidence without observation time, expiry and cache policy.
- Buyer implementation, live runtime enforcement, settled payment, verified deletion or certification are not established.
- No expanded capabilities or licences for existing INDEX executables.
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OAuth evidence — Inactive result and disclosure limits
Does active false in an introspection response identify revocation as the cause?
For an authorized call, RFC 7662 returns active false when the token is inactive, unknown to that server, or unavailable for that resource to inspect. Further cause information should be withheld. Invalid credentials for the inspection call instead produce an authorization error. The result alone does not identify the cause.
Documentation reviewed 2026-11-05. Primary source.
Boundaries
- Do not infer revocation, nonexistence or a specific offboarding cause from active false alone.
- Buyer implementation, live runtime enforcement, settled payment, verified deletion or certification are not established.
- No expanded capabilities or licences for existing INDEX executables.
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OAuth evidence — Current actor versus historical actors
May an authorization decision inherit authority from a prior actor nested inside an OAuth act claim?
RFC 8693 identifies the current actor in the outermost act claim. Nested actors are informational delegation history. Access-control decisions must consider only the top-level token claims and current actor, rather than granting authority from prior actors.
Documentation reviewed 2026-11-05. Primary source.
Boundaries
- Do not promote historical actor identities into current permission; validate the token and applicable policy separately.
- Buyer implementation, live runtime enforcement, settled payment, verified deletion or certification are not established.
- No expanded capabilities or licences for existing INDEX executables.
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OAuth evidence — Issued representation and usage type
Can every value in the token-exchange access_token field be sent as an OAuth Bearer credential?
RFC 8693 uses access_token as a response field even when the issued object is not an OAuth access token. issued_token_type describes its representation; token_type describes its use. N_A indicates that an OAuth usage type does not apply. The field name alone does not establish Bearer usability.
Documentation reviewed 2026-11-05. Primary source.
Boundaries
- Do not select an authentication scheme from the field name; inspect issued type, usage type and recipient requirements.
- Buyer implementation, live runtime enforcement, settled payment, verified deletion or certification are not established.
- No expanded capabilities or licences for existing INDEX executables.
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OAuth evidence — Scope across requested targets
Does one scope list in a multi-target token exchange assign different scopes to different recipients?
RFC 8693 defines the request as asking for every requested scope at every requested target, rather than positional scope-to-recipient pairs. Broad requests may be refused, including with invalid_target. Requested combinations remain distinct from the rights actually issued.
Documentation reviewed 2026-11-05. Primary source.
Boundaries
- Do not interpret a shared scope list as per-recipient least privilege or proof of granted access.
- Buyer implementation, live runtime enforcement, settled payment, verified deletion or certification are not established.
- No expanded capabilities or licences for existing INDEX executables.
Complete record JSON · Exact free preview JSON · Source review
OAuth evidence — Service failure and revocation recovery
Can an agent mark credential revocation complete after the provider returns HTTP 503?
RFC 7009 requires a client receiving HTTP 503 to assume the token still exists. It may retry after a reasonable delay; Retry-After can indicate expected unavailability. A failed revocation request is not completion evidence.
Documentation reviewed 2026-11-05. Primary source.
Boundaries
- Keep revocation unresolved after HTTP 503. Later outcome and applicable scope require separate review; retries do not prove all access has ended.
- Buyer implementation, live runtime enforcement, settled payment, verified deletion or certification are not established.
- No expanded capabilities or licences for existing INDEX executables.
Complete record JSON · Exact free preview JSON · Source review